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THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION: ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 
VIA THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), formerly the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), estimates that there are 
approximately seven million unauthorized immigrants living in the United 
States.1  Studies have found that immigrants, both those lawfully present and 
undocumented, comprise an increasingly large share of the U.S. labor force.2  
At least one study has found that of the 17.9 million foreign-born workers 12.7 
million are here legally, while approximately 5.2 million are working either 
with expired work authorization or without work authorization altogether.3  
The low-wage labor force has the highest share of undocumented workers.4  It 
is widely believed that undocumented workers in the low wage sector face an 
increased risk of being taken advantage of by their U.S. based employers, 
either by underpayment, non-payment, or arbitrary termination from their jobs, 
often through coercion and threats of deportation.5 
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 
agreed that a man named Jose Castro, who was employed at a company in 
California, was unlawfully fired due to his union activities.6  The National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that the employee was wrongfully 
terminated and recommended that the traditional remedies of back pay and 
 
 1. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000 1 
(2001), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/publist.htm (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2004). 
 2. RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, URBAN INSTITUTE IMMIGRATION 
STUDIES PROGRAM, A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE 1 (2003), at 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310880 (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). 
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. Id. at 5 (the study finds that of the 8.6 million low-wage immigrant workers, 3.4 million, 
or 40%, are undocumented and approximately 23% are naturalized citizens). 
 5. Sarah Cleveland, Beth Lyon & Rebecca Smith, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Amicus Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Remedies Are 
Restricted on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 795, 806-09 (2003). 
 6. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
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reinstatement be granted.7  The company objected, claiming that the man’s 
immigration status as an undocumented worker did not give him the right to 
work, and thus, he was not entitled to an award of back pay or reinstatement.8  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed that the remedy was in conflict with 
federal immigration laws and therefore Mr. Castro was not entitled to the 
typical remedies under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).9  Many 
critics of the decision have argued that this creates an incentive for employers 
to hire and abuse undocumented workers.10  Supporters have argued that the 
decision settles conflicts between federal immigration and labor laws.11 
This comment will explore the right of association of unauthorized 
workers in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman and whether the 
prohibition of back pay to undocumented workers fired for their union activity, 
in contravention of United States labor laws, violates the law of nations.  
Further, the possibility of using the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) as a 
mechanism for undocumented workers to obtain back pay denied to them by 
U.S. based employers will be explored.  The following sections of this paper 
will define and then set forth the key legal issues in labor, immigration, and 
international law to determine whether a prohibition in awarding back pay to 
unauthorized workers violates international treaty or customary law and if that 
violation is actionable under the ATCA.12 
II.  UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND LABOR RIGHTS IN THE U.S. 
A. Definitions 
In order to understand the distinctions made by federal immigration and 
labor laws, the definitions of “employee,” “employer,” and “unauthorized 
alien” must be given, along with clarification of the terms as used in this paper.  
Definitions in federal labor and immigration laws tend to be concerned with 
defining terms in the context of the purpose of the particular act.  For instance, 
the immigration regulations define “employer,” for the purpose of prohibiting 
employment of an “unauthorized alien,” to mean any agent or person who 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 146. 
 9. Id. at 151-52. 
 10. See Rebecca Smith and Maria Blanco, Used and Abused: The Treatment of 
Undocumented Victims of Labor Law Violations Since Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 8 
BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 890 (2003); see also Gabriela Robin, Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. 
v. National Labor Relations Board: A Step Backwards For All Workers in the United States, 9 
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 679, 694 (2003). 
 11. See generally, Timothy M. Cox, A Call to Revisit Sure-Tan v. NLRB: Undocumented 
Workers and Their Right to Back Pay, 30 SW. U.L. REV. 505 (2001). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001). 
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engages the services or labor of an employee.13  The regulations further define 
“employee” to mean a person who provides services or labor for an 
employer.14  These definitions are circular because they reference each other 
without actually defining either “employee” or “employer.”  The Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) provides a specific definition of “unauthorized 
alien” to mean an immigrant or alien who is not authorized by the Attorney 
General as either lawfully admitted as a permanent resident or as an immigrant 
or alien authorized under United States law to be employed in the United 
States.15  The terms “undocumented worker” and “unauthorized workers” will 
be used in this paper to refer to workers who lack the proper documentation to 
be employed legally in the United States.  Undocumented workers may either 
be aliens who lack any legal authorization to be present in the United States or 
legal aliens present in the United States, but unauthorized to work.16 
Similarly, but without reference to a person’s immigration status, the 
NLRA defines employee to: 
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any 
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has 
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment.17 
Employer is defined only as including any person acting as an agent of the 
employer.18  Under the NLRA “back pay” is a remedy received by an 
employee who has been wrongfully terminated under the Act.19  An employee 
discriminated against in violation of the NLRA is entitled to any damages that 
result in a loss of earnings.  The employee is entitled to be made whole by the 
 
 13. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g) (2002) (The term employer means “a person or entity, including an 
agent or anyone acting directly or indirectly in the interest thereof, who engages the services or 
labor of an employee to be performed in the United States for wages or other remuneration.  In 
the case of an independent contractor or contract labor or services, the term employer shall mean 
the independent contractor or contractor and not the person or entity using the contract labor.”). 
 14. Id. § 274a.1(f) (The term employee means “an individual who provides services or labor 
for an employer for wages or other remuneration but does not mean independent 
contractors . . .”). 
 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (“As used in this section, the term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, 
with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time 
either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so 
employed by this Act or by the Attorney General.”). 
 16. RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 4-5 (1997) (describing the difference between workers who enter a country through 
clandestine means and others who enter lawfully into a country but are not legally permitted to 
work). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001). 
 18. Id. § 152(2). 
 19. 1 N. PETER LAREAU, NAT’L LABOR REL. ACT: LAW & PRACTICE § 8.13(2)(a) (2003). 
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employer.  Remedies include, if appropriate, payment of all wages and benefits 
lost, plus interest.20  
B. Right of Association and Undocumented Workers Under the NLRA 
Undocumented workers have historically, and to varying degrees, been 
afforded basic protections under various federal labor acts.  The right to 
organize is one of the areas in which the rights of undocumented workers have 
been protected to some degree.21  However, these labor protections have at 
times come into conflict with federal immigration policies.  In 1984, the 
Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB22 affirmed in part the National Labor 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) interpretation of the NLRA on two key issues.  
First, the Court found that the NLRA’s definition of “employee” included 
“undocumented aliens” and extended some protection under the Act for 
collective bargaining purposes.23  Secondly, the Court held that there was no 
conflict between the application of the NLRA to undocumented employees and 
the mandate of the INA.24  The Court in Sure-Tan reasoned that the remedy for 
discriminatory discharge, which included back pay and/or reinstatement, did 
not wholly turn on the employee’s legal status in the United States, although 
the Court’s decision placed limitations on remedial measures based on the 
employee’s immigration status.25  The Court also determined that the remedies 
of back pay and reinstatement were available to immigrant workers who were 
able to prove or obtain lawful entry into the United States.26 
In Sure-Tan, the Court reasoned that the “task of defining the term 
‘employee’ is one that ‘has been assigned primarily to the agency created by 
Congress to administer the Act’” and accorded the NLRB deference to its 
interpretation.27  Further, the Court found no conflict between the federal labor 
and immigration laws.  The Court reasoned, in part, that Congress did not at 
that time make it unlawful to employ “undocumented aliens.”28  The Court 
found that the purpose of the NLRA in protecting workplace conditions and 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor 
Protection and the Need for Reform, HARV. C.R.-C.L.L REV. 345, 352 (2001) (noting that the 
Court’s decisions previous to the passage of the Immigration Reform Control Act (IRCA) defined 
undocumented workers as employees within the definition of the NLRA).  However, the author 
also notes that the decision limited the remedy of back pay to those immigrant workers who were 
“available” based on immigration status.  Id. at 353. 
 22. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 892. 
 25. Id. at 902-05. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 
130 (1944)). 
 28. Id. 
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employee rights was furthered, as protecting worker rights created a 
disincentive for employers to abuse the rights of undocumented employees.29  
Ultimately, the Court found a violation of the NLRA where the employer 
reported the undocumented worker to immigration authorities as part of a 
direct retaliation for participating in union activities.30  However, it reversed 
the decision of the court of appeals to impose a minimum back pay award and 
specific reinstatement offers.31  In his concurrence, Justice Brennan 
foreshadowed what would become a major critique of the Court’s later 
decision in Hoffman.  He stated “[o]nce employers . . . realize that they may 
violate the NLRA with respect to their undocumented alien employees without 
fear of having to recompense those workers for lost back pay, their ‘incentive 
to hire such illegal aliens’ will not decline, it will increase.”32 
The 5-4 decision in Sure-Tan reflected the subsequent circuit split 
regarding the eligibility of back pay for unlawful termination of undocumented 
workers.33  In 2002, the Supreme Court in Hoffman revisited the issue of 
remedial measures under the NLRA.34  In the interim years between the 
Court’s decision in Sure-Tan and its decision in Hoffman, changes had been 
made to federal immigration laws that would substantially impact how the 
Court would view an undocumented worker’s entitlement to back pay under 
the NLRA. 
Specifically, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA).35  The Act clearly stated that one of the central purposes of the 
IRCA was to combat the employment of unlawfully present immigrants, 
 
 29. Id. at 893. 
 30. Id. at 891-92. 
 31. Id. at 906. 
 32. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 912 (Brennan, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting 
the majority opinion, id. at 893). 
 33. NLRB v. A.P.R.A Fuel Oil, 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (U.S. employer who 
knowingly hires undocumented workers cannot use the IRCA as a shield to avoid liability under 
the NLRA); Del Rey Tortilleria v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (required 
“employees” to show that that they are lawfully available for employment during the back pay 
period); Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1989) (undocumented 
workers employed in violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act  (IRCA) are subject to 
risks of immigration laws); NLRB v. Felbro, 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
NLRB’s decision to condition Felbro’s payment of back pay upon proof of legal status in the U.S. 
is inconsistent with NLRA and immigration law). 
 34. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137. 
 35. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a (a)(2), 1324a (e)(4)(A), 1324a(f)(1), 1324c(a)(1)-(3) (1994) 
(combating employment of illegal aliens made central to the policy of immigration law and 
further established an employment verification system.  It made it unlawful for the employer to 
knowingly hire undocumented immigrant workers subjecting employers to a civil penalty and 
possible criminal prosecution.  It also made it a criminal offense for undocumented workers to 
use false documents for the purpose of obtaining employment in the United States). 
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making it illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers.36  
The IRCA also made it unlawful for those immigrants to obtain and to use 
false documentation in order to gain employment.  Both employers and 
undocumented workers were now subject to civil and criminal penalties for 
violation of the Act.37  Despite the enactment of the IRCA, the NLRB 
indicated that awards of back pay to undocumented workers were proper but 
were unavailable “during periods when [the workers] were not lawfully 
entitled to be present and employed in the United States.”38 
In 2002 however, the Court in Hoffman held that allowing the NLRB to 
award back pay to “illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory 
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA.  It 
would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration 
authorities, condone prior violations of immigration laws, and encourage future 
violations.”39  The Court was explicit in indicating that the NLRB still had at 
its disposal other remedial measures when dealing with the NLRA, such as 
cease and desist orders and notice postings.40  However, the statutory remedies 
of back pay and reinstatement were found to be in conflict with federal 
immigration laws.  Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that because immigration 
laws made it impossible for undocumented workers to find employment in the 
United States without contravening federal immigration law, awarding back 
pay under the labor laws to “illegal aliens” would run counter to immigration 
policy.41  Thus, undocumented workers are no longer entitled to back pay for 
wrongful termination under the NLRA. 
The decision in Hoffman was sharply split, with four Justices dissenting.  
Justice Breyer, who authored the dissent, stated, “I cannot agree that the back 
pay award before us, ‘runs counter to,’ or ‘trenches upon,’ national 
immigration policy.”42  The dissent found, as the court did earlier in Sure-Tan, 
that the enforcement of labor laws, including awarding back pay for unlawful 
discharge for union activities, was congruent with the purposes of immigration 
laws.43  The dissent reasoned that an order from the NLRB to grant back pay 
was a reasonable deterrence to employers who seek to unlawfully deny the 
right of workers to organize and also served to further immigration policy by 
deterring the hiring of undocumented workers for exploitation.44  In effect, the 
decision in Hoffman recognized the “illegality” of an undocumented worker’s 
 
 36. Id. § 1324a(a). 
 37. Id. 
 38. WEST, 11 EMP. COORD. § 43.80 (2004). 
 39. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151. 
 40. Id. at 152. 
 41. Id. at 149. 
 42. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 153-55. 
 44. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155. 
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employment by penalizing the undocumented worker for the unlawful actions 
of the employer. 
The rights of undocumented workers, with respect to pay for work actually 
performed, continues to be covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA),45 which sets minimum standards for working conditions in the United 
States.46  The FLSA defines the term “employee”47 to include undocumented 
workers who can bring an action under the Act for unpaid wages and 
liquidated damages.48  However, the FLSA was not intended to regulate labor 
relations, except to substitute its own minimum wage rate for any that was 
substandard and an overtime rate for hours above the number it set.49  In Singh 
v. Jutla, a recent case deciding whether the Hoffman analysis applies to the 
FLSA, a federal district court in California declined to extend the Hoffman 
analysis to state and FLSA remedial measures for undocumented workers.50  In 
Singh, a man from India was awarded $200,000 in unpaid wages and damages 
for retaliation.51  While the federal district court in this case declined to extend 
the scope of Hoffman, other commentators predict that various federal courts 
may reach an opposite result.52  What is known is that while undocumented 
workers are still entitled to payment for work actually performed, back pay for 
unlawful retaliatory measures under the NLRA is not allowed.  Despite this 
decision protecting the rights of undocumented workers under the FSLA, the 
substantive federal laws protecting an undocumented worker’s right to 
participate in or organize labor unions continues to be severely undercut by the 
Court’s decision in Hoffman.53 
III.  INVOKING THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO 
ORGANIZE FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Overview of the Alien Tort Claims Act 
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), enacted in 1789, provides that the 
“[d]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
 
 45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2001). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. § 203(e). 
 48. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R Oil Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (2002) (though Hoffman 
prevents an undocumented worker from seeking back pay, it does not preclude an undocumented 
worker from seeking any form of relief, as shown through the court’s granting of both injunctive 
and declaratory relief). 
 51. Bob Egelko, Jury Awards $200,000 to Illegal Immigrant, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2003, 
at A3. 
 52. See generally supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 53. Id. 
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for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”54  The ATCA creates federal jurisdiction over a tort committed 
in violation of the law of nations.  The ATCA has been primarily directed 
toward the action of states in violation of the law of nations or treaties.55  
Under the ATCA either treaty obligations, the law of nations, or customary law 
may give rise to a lawsuit under the Act.56  The “law of nations” is defined by 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as: (1) 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and (3) the general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations.57  In order to support a tort action of 
customary international law, the norm must be “universal, definable, and 
obligatory.”58  However, there is no requirement of unanimity between all 
nations, but just a general recognition that the action is prohibited.59 
In a seminal case extending federal court jurisdiction under the ATCA, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ruled that an 
act of torture committed by a state official against a person in detention 
constituted a violation under the law of nations.60  In order to establish that 
torture violated the law of nations, the court consulted the work of international 
jurists, general usage, practice of nations, the United Nations Charter, United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions, international treaties, and documents 
expressing U.S. policy on the matter.61 
Recently, the ATCA has also been used as a vehicle to litigate claims of 
persons who have suffered human rights abuses committed abroad including 
torture, genocide, war crimes, summary execution, arbitrary detention, and 
compulsory labor claims against states and non-state actors such as 
 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001). 
 55. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATCA 
provides federal jurisdiction in a claim against a Paraguayan official by the estate of a torture and 
murder victim); see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(dismissing an action brought under the ATCA by survivors of persons murdered in an attack on 
a civilian bus in Israel).  Congress confirmed the Second Circuit’s approach by enacting the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (concerning genocide, rape, and torture in the 
former Yugoslavia). 
 56. DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 768 (2001). 
 57. Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 13, 1920, art. 38, 6 
L.N.T.S. 390, reprinted in ALEXANDER P. FACHIRI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: ITS CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE AND WORK 355 (1932). 
 58. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 59. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
 60. Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 876, 878. 
 61. Id. at 880-81. 
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corporations.62  U.S. courts have construed the ATCA, in the context of human 
rights, to extend to violations under the “law of nations,” including torture, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.63  For example in Kadic v. Karadzic, 
the Second Circuit expanded the scope of the ATCA so that it not only applies 
to state actors, but also those persons acting as private individuals.64  The court 
indicated that acts such as genocide and war crimes do not require state action 
to be a violation of the law of nations, although the court also cautioned that 
some violations do require perpetration by a state actor.65  In fact, it has been 
suggested that the relative increased use of ATCA claims against private 
corporations has led U.S. courts to apply more readily apply international 
human rights standards under the ATCA.66 
B. Application of the ATCA in Labor and Migrant Workers Claims 
Nothing in the statute prohibits the use of the ATCA to enforce the rights 
of immigrant workers and the freedom to associate.67  The ATCA may be used 
as a vehicle to enforce the rights of “unauthorized workers” in the United 
States, in conjunction with other remedial measures under state and federal law 
have failed.  Problematic prongs of the ATCA in the context of labor rights are 
whether freedom of association falls within the realm of the law of nations and 
whether failure to provide an adequate remedy to protect this right is 
actionable under the statute. 
Historically, the ATCA has been used to challenge conduct committed 
outside the United States.  The ATCA has also been invoked domestically by 
immigrants to challenge the conditions of detention pending removal and 
 
 62. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing 
dismissal of ATCA claims for torture, imprisonment, and killings allegedly performed by 
Nigerian authorities at the instigation of private oil companies); In re World War II Era Japanese 
Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that forced labor 
allegations by Chinese and Korean workers stated a claim under ATCA but dismissing claims as 
time-barred); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that 
non-state actors may be liable for slavery and forced labor under ATCA, but granting summary 
judgment for defendants on facts of the case); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 
491 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding the same, as to slave labor claims brought under ATCA against 
German subsidiary of Ford Motor Co.); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997) (holding that Burmese pipeline workers alleging forced labor and slavery stated a 
claim under ATCA). 
 63. Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and 
Historical Context, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 436 (2002). 
 64. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
 65. Id. at 244. 
 66. Elliot Schrage, Emerging Threat: Human Rights Claims, HARV. BUS. REVIEW, Aug. 
2003, at 1. 
 67. Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and Domestic Enforcement of International 
Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 532-33 (2002). 
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forced labor claims of aliens within the United States.68  In a case that comes 
close to applying the ATCA in the domestic labor context for violations of 
international labor rights, immigrant workers in Saipan initiated three class 
action suits against clothing manufacturers based on the island.69  The lawsuits 
were filed in 1999 and challenged unlawful factory conditions.70  Two of the 
lawsuits claimed federal jurisdiction under the ATCA.71  In one of the ATCA 
related cases, 30,000 foreign garment workers brought suit against nineteen 
retailers and eleven Saipan-based garment contractors.72  In another ATCA 
suit, immigrant workers sued in federal court in Saipan alleging, in part, that 
they were drawn to Saipan with promises of jobs but were subject to 
deplorable working conditions, indentured servitude, unsanitary living and 
working conditions, unpaid work, and forced abortions.73 
Saipan, located in the Northern Pacific Ocean, is part of a chain of islands 
known as the Northern Marianas.74  More than one-half of the population on 
the island consists of foreign workers.75  The island’s status as a U.S. territory 
makes specific federal laws, including some labor laws, enforceable on the 
island.76  Immigration law on the island is controlled by local administration 
 
 68. Papa v. I.N.S., 281 F. 3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (claiming violations of the ATCA 
for the killing of an immigrant while in I.N.S custody); Manliguez v.  Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 
377, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (claim brought alleging abuse and forced labor as domestic servant); 
Ashik Ahmed v. Ahm Sadiqul Hoque, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14852 at *1, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(claim was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction, but alleged abuse and forced labor of a domestic 
servant); Pushpa Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 77 (2002) (claiming violation of the ACTA for 
trafficking, involuntary servitude, and false imprisonment). 
 69. Saipan Sweatshop Litigation: An Update (March 11, 2002), at 
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/update_mar02.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. First-ever Lawsuits Filed Charging Sweatshop Conspiracy Between Major U.S. Clothing 
Designers and Retailers, Foreign Textile Producers, (January 13, 1999), at 
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/lawsuit.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004) 
(companies listed in the lawsuits included: The Gap; Cutter & Buck, Inc.; Target Corp.; J. Crew, 
Inc.; J.C. Penny Company, Inc.; Nordstrom, Inc.; Sears Roebuck & Company; The Limited, Inc.; 
OshKosh B’Gosh, Inc.; Jones Apparel Group, Inc.; Gymboree Corp.; The Associated 
Merchandising Corp.; The May Department Stores Company; The Dress Barns, Inc.; Lane 
Bryant, Inc.; Tommy Hilfinger USA, Inc.; Warnaco Group, Inc.; Calvin Klein, Inc.; Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co.; The Talbots, Inc.; Brooks Brothers; Woolrich, Inc.; and Levi Strauss). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS § 23-201 (2003). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 23-204 (noting that the NLRA, FLSA (with certain exceptions), Family Medical 
Leave Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Social Security Act, Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act, and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act are applicable on the 
island). 
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rather than by U.S. federal immigration statutes.77  The lawsuits were 
ultimately settled out of court, including a twenty million dollar award and the 
establishment of an independent monitoring program to ensure compliance 
with international labor and human rights standards.78  Some commentators 
suggest that this case serves as an important model for U.S. federal courts to 
extend their jurisdiction over transnational corporations using the ATCA.79  
The case, however, may also serve as an example of how domestic courts can 
apply the ATCA to enforce international labor standards, including the 
freedom of association, for alien workers within the borders of the United 
States. 
Professor Michael Wishnie has noted that “[s]lavery, servitude, and forced 
labor are now banned by numerous international instruments, and public and 
private violations of the prohibitions are fully enforceable under ATCA, as the 
courts to consider the question have uniformly held.”80  Wishnie and other 
commentators have also noted several potential difficulties in enforcing 
international labor rights under the ATCA.  Sarah Cleveland noted that 
“[d]espite the fact that slavery and forced labor enjoy a status akin to torture in 
the international human rights lexicon, the ATCA has been largely neglected 
as a means for enforcing this prohibition or any other core international labor 
standard.”81 
However, Virginia Leary wrote that a strong argument could be made for 
the status of freedom of association and the right to organize as customary 
international law, binding on all nations.82  First, she argued that while the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States does 
not explicitly list freedom of association as recognized under customary 
international law, its omission is not determinative of its status under the law 
of nations.83  She contended that the Restatement is not an exclusive list of 
rights but that the determination of whether a human rights norm has become 
customary international law is based on the criteria of legal adherence and its 
adoption by national and international bodies.84 
 
 77. Id. at 23-206. 
 78. Jenny Strasburg, Saipan Lawsuit Terms OKs: Garment Workers Get $20 Million, S. F. 
CHRON., Apr. 25, 2003, at B1. 
 79. Jane C. Hong, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct: Finding a Private Right of 
Action for International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Right Violations, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
41, 61 (2000). 
 80. Wishnie, supra note 67, at 536. 
 81. Sarah Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1533, 1574 (1998). 
 82. VIRGINIA A. LEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 
(1996). 
 83. Id. at 32. 
 84. Id. 
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IV.  FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The freedom of association includes the rights to organize, to bargain 
collectively, and to strike.85  In a treatise regarding the right of association, 
author Sheldon Leader described the philosophical and political underpinnings 
of this right: 
Right to freedom of association is, in its strongest form, a bilateral liberty 
indicating that one is neither under an obligation to associate or to dissociate, 
and this is coupled with an immunity from any imposition of a contrary duty as 
well as by a claim-right against other forms of interference either by the state, 
private groups, or individuals.86 
For a state to meet its international obligations of the freedom of association 
requires it to take a “negative” rights approach, or the obligation of the state to 
allow workers to exercise these rights free of encumbrances, and a “positive” 
rights approach that includes the state’s obligation to protect these rights if 
violated.87 
The right to organize, or freedom of association, has been subject over 
time to different interpretations amongst nations as to the extent and nature of 
national protections to be afforded.88  Despite the varying governmental 
policies protecting the freedom of association, this fundamental right has been 
consistently defined as the right of workers to form and join trade unions for 
the protection of their interests.89  The contours of the freedom of association 
have been further defined in several international treaties and covenants. 
A. Treaties and Covenants 
Modern international human rights law has its foundation in the United 
Nations Charter and three related treaties: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).90  Conventions or treaties are agreements between states that 
create legally binding rules for the parties.  The Vienna Convention describes a 
treaty as an agreement concluded between states that must be written and is 
 
 85. Lance Compa, Assessing Assessment: A Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries’ 
Compliance with Freedom of Association Standards, at 4 (September 30, 2002), available at 
http:// www.national-acadamies.org/internationallabor. 
 86. SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 15 (1992). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. LEARY, supra note 82, at 29 (citing the 1919 ILO Constitution; 1944, ILO Declaration of 
Philadelphia, ILO Convention Nos. 87 & 98, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 90. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted 
in WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 8-9. 
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governed by international law.91  The Vienna Convention also provides that 
once a treaty has entered into force, it must be observed in good faith.92  
Participation in treaties can range from bilateral treaties to multilateral 
treaties.93 
1. ICCPR & ICESCR 
The United States is bound by its ratification of the ICCPR.  Article 2(1) of 
the Covenant ensures to “all individuals” the rights recognized in the ICCPR 
without distinction of any kind.94  Currently, the ICCPR has 151 signatory 
countries.95  Commentary to the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee 
states that the rights set forth in the ICCPR apply to everyone, irrespective of 
reciprocity and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness, and must 
be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.96  Article 
22(1) recognizes the right of everyone to the “association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions.”97  However, this Article also 
permits restrictions on the exercise of this right as prescribed by law to protect 
national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health 
or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.98  As author 
Rysard Cholewinski notes, “these limitation clauses, therefore, present state 
parties with the possibility of further restricting aliens’ and migrant workers’ 
rights: ‘Invoking these clauses, and provided such measures do not amount to 
the ‘destruction of the rights at stake, governments can suspend or limit the 
exercise by aliens of certain rights.”99  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hoffman, however, does not consider the United States’ international 
obligations or limitations under the Covenant. 
 
 91. Id. at 110. 
 92. See id. at 111. 
 93. Id. 
 94. International Convention for Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 2, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 37 
(David Weissbrodt, et al. eds., 2001) (“Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure the all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”). 
 95. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONAL HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
STATUS RATIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AS OF 
NOVEMBER 2, 2003 (2003). 
 96. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 41 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40, at 117-19, U.N. 
Doc. A/41/40 (1986). 
 97. ICCPR, supra note 93, at 42. 
 98. Id. 
 99. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 55 (quoting M. Tardou, Migrant Workers, in 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 372-73 (R. Bernhadt ed., 1981)). 
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The United States is also a signatory to the ICESCR but has not ratified the 
treaty.100  The treaty has 148 state signatories.101  As such, the United States is 
arguably not bound by the specific provisions of the treaty.  As a signatory to 
the Convention, however, the United States is obliged not to defeat the object 
and purpose of the treaty.102  Article 8 of the treaty obliges state parties to 
undertake to ensure the right of everyone to form trade unions in order to 
protect economic and social interests.103 
While a treaty sets out the obligations that parties have committed 
themselves to, states may, in some instances, modify their interpretation of the 
treaty by entering a reservation or declaration at the time the state becomes a 
party to the treaty.104  Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention defines a 
reservation as a “unilateral statement . . . made by the State . . . whereby it 
purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty 
in application to that State.”105  However, the reservations must be compatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty in question.106  For instance, in the 
case of a human rights treaty, it would not be permissible to enter a reservation 
that would allow a state to continue to practice torture, as this would clearly 
conflict with the purpose of the treaty. 
In ratifying the ICCRP, the United States entered a declaration that the 
treaty was not self-executing.107  However, some courts have held that non-
self-executing treaties may still have domestic effect.108  Other courts, 
however, have used the non-self-executing provision of treaties to rule that 
 
 100. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 28 
(David Weissbrodt et al. eds. 2001). 
 101. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONAL HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 94. 
 102. Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention], reprinted in P.K. MELON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN 
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 178 (1992). 
 103. ICESCR, supra note 100, at art. 8. 
 104. WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 113. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 112. 
 107. UNITED NATIONS, ICCPR DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS, available at 
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/reservations/ccpr.htm. (last visited Apr. 18, 
2004). 
 108. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594-5 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting United 
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1974)); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 
206, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (S.D. 
Fla. 2001); see also David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties,  24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999). 
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they are not judicially enforceable in United States courts.109  While federal 
courts have been inconsistent in determining whether U.S. reservations make 
certain human rights treaties enforceable in the courts, the United States’ 
obligation under international law remains intact.110  However, the failure of 
courts to apply particular treaty provisions due to a reservation or failure to 
ratify a treaty would not have effect, because the state may still be bound if 
aspects of the treaty have become norms under customary international law.111 
2. International Labor Organization Conventions 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) was founded in 1919 by the 
Treaty of Versailles both to regulate international labor standards and to offset 
economic and competitive disadvantages incurred by states attempting to 
institute fair labor practices.112  The ILO promotes human rights through the 
standard setting and adoption of conventions dealing with general and specific 
labor rights.113  At their essence, ILO standards are concerned with the 
promotion of human rights, including fundamental freedoms and rights of 
individuals.114  The ILO conventions impose binding legal obligations on states 
that ratify them — to adopt national laws and practices in conformity with the 
conventions.115  Trade union rights include the right to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining and are fundamental tenets of the ILO.116  The 
United States is bound by virtue of its ILO membership to protect the freedom 
of association found in the following two conventions.117 
Specifically, Article 2 of the ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize bestows workers and 
employers, without distinction, the right to establish their own organizations.118  
Convention 98 Article 1.1 indicates that workers shall enjoy adequate 
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination with respect to their 
 
 109. See id. at 594 (citing Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 263-68 (5th Cir. 2001) (ICCPR 
does not apply to the imposition of the death penalty in the United States as the treaty was non-
self executing)). 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 115(b) (1986) (“That the rule of international law or a provision of an international 
agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international 
obligations or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.”). 
 111. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (1988). 
 112. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 80. 
 113. Id. at 81. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 82. 
 116. Id. at 111. 
 117. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 111. 
 118. Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, Jul. 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, 19. 
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employment.119  David Montgomery has noted that “[h]ere in the United States 
freedom of association has long provided an essential link between the exercise 
of human rights and conditions of employment.  Nineteenth-century workers 
justified their collective action, before the courts and before public opinion, as 
constitutionally sanctioned freedom of speech and association.”120 
3. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
The freedom of association was further reinforced by the United States’ 
ratification of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC) in 1993.121  The NAALC was a side agreement to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Unlike other international 
conventions, NAALC affirms the right of each party to establish its own labor 
laws and regulations and imposed a duty to strive continually to improve labor 
standards.122  But Article 2 of the Agreement also provides that each member 
party must ensure that its labor laws provide for high labor standards.123 
The NAALC recognizes the freedom of association.124  Specifically the 
Labor Principles in Annex I of the agreement state that the parties to the 
agreement commit to promote principles under each country’s domestic legal 
regime including the “freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize.”125  Article 4 of the treaty further binds the United States to ensure 
that parties with a legally recognized interest under its laws have access to the 
courts or administrative processes to enforce a member state’s labor laws. 126  
The agreement allows for remedies to ensure enforcement of labor rights 
including orders, fines, penalties, imprisonment, and injunctions.127  In turn, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman served to diminish previously 
existing protections of labor rights, including the remedy of back pay to 
 
 119. Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively, Jul. 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257, 258. 
 120. David Montgomery, Labor Rights and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 16 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen 
F. Diamond eds., 1996). 
 121. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. 1502 
[hereinafter NAALC], reprinted in 2000 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO NAFTA: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 396 (2000) (affirming full respect for each Party’s constitution, and 
recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or 
modify accordingly it labor laws and regulations.  Each Party shall ensure that its labor laws and 
regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent with high quality and productivity 
workplaces, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that light). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 395-96. 
 125. Id. at 395. 
 126. NAALC, supra note 121, at 397. 
 127. Id. at 398. 
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undocumented workers in the United States.128  The Court’s decision in 
Hoffman recognized the legal interest of undocumented immigrant workers as 
“employees,” but it did not ensure proper enforcement of their rights under 
domestic law. 
B. Customary International Law 
Customary international law arises when a state considers itself required to 
act or to refrain from acting in a specific manner.  This requirement of 
consistent state practice over time must stem from a sense of legal obligation 
that such state acts are required by law, also known as opinio juris.129  In the 
context of human rights, several customs have been recognized, including 
prohibitions against genocide, torture, slavery, extra-judicial disappearance or 
murder, arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination.130  While many of these 
rules have been codified into treaty law, customary rules do not have to be 
written down in order to prove their existence.131  One of the most important 
aspects of customary international law is that it is binding on states, whether 
they have consented to it or not.  The only way a state may not be bound is by 
consistent and express objection to the rule during its formation.132 
Customary international law creates legal obligations that may bind the 
United States.  As early as 1784, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
international law is considered to be part of the law of the United States.133  
The United States generally considers customary international legal rules to be 
incorporated into its domestic legal order.134  In Paquete Habana, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered 
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for determination.  For this purpose, 
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations.135 
Thus, customary international law is considered federal law and is supreme 
over state law.136  Treaties and statutes may supersede customary international 
law, however.  Where a statute is ambiguous, U.S. courts will attempt to 
interpret federal law so as to avoid conflict with international law, whether that 
 
 128. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151. 
 129. WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 22. 
 130. Id. at 209-10. 
 131. Id. at 22. 
 132. Id. at 719. 
 133. Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 112 (1784). 
 134. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 135. Id. at 677. 
 136. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-32 (1964). 
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international law is in the form of a treaty or custom.137  United States courts 
have recognized customary international law, including human rights norms, in 
which there is a consensus in the international community that the right is 
protected and where there is a shared understanding of the scope of that 
protection.138  Generally, the development of customary human rights law is 
established differently than other customary law, due to the historic notion that 
human rights have been a matter treated between a state and its citizens.139 
Support for the proposition that freedom of association has risen to the 
level of customary law also stems from several sources including international 
instruments that recognized the freedom of association as a fundamental right.  
Several international bodies, including the ILO, have stated that “freedom of 
association has become a customary rule.”140  Further evidence of opinio juris 
is state adoption of domestic laws that protect the freedom of association.  As 
discussed above, labor laws in the United States clearly protect the right of 
employees to form trade unions.141  Additionally, as demonstrated below, 
several other sources can be used to demonstrate the acceptance of freedom of 
association as part of customary international law. 
1. National Legislation 
Many countries have explicitly recognized the right to freedom of 
association in the texts of their legal instruments, such as constitutions or 
statutes.142  National legislation recognizing the right to association and 
supporting legislation providing protection of such a right is evidence of 
consistent state practice over time that stems from a sense of legal obligation.  
In Europe, both national and European Union law protects the freedom of 
association.  For example, the right to freedom of association and assembly is 
 
 137. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 108, 109 (1804). 
 138. Stephens, supra note 63, at 464; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 867, 884 (2nd Cir. 
1990); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 701 cmt. b (1986).  Practices accepted as building customary human rights law include: 
virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its human rights provisions and 
virtually universal and frequently reiterated acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights even only in principle.  Id. 
 140. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN CHILE: REPORT OF 
THE FACT-FINDING AND CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ¶ 466, at 
108 (1975) (finding that although Chile had not ratified the Freedom of Association and 
Protection to of the Right to Organize ILO Convention No. 87, its membership to the ILO bound 
it to the Convention; further noting that the freedom of association has become customary 
international law). 
 141. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (2004). 
 142. For more information see ILO Natalex database available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home?p_lang=en (last viewed Apr. 18, 2004). 
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recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.143  
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this right in the context 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.144 
Several countries protect the right to freedom of association through 
constitutional provisions.  Under such a legal scheme, the constitutional 
recognition of the right to organize trade unions or freedom of association is 
regarded as a fundamental source of labor law in that particular country.  For 
example in South Korea, Article 33 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the 
right of workers to organize.145  This constitutional provision serves as a basis 
for further labor legislation.146  Other countries recognizing a constitutional 
right to the freedom of association include: Brazil,147 Canada,148 Germany,149 
Japan,150 Mexico,151 Italy,152 South Africa,153 and Spain.154 
Other countries, including the United States,155 do not recognize the right 
to form trade unions in their constitutions, but explicitly recognize this right 
under national or federal laws.  For example, the United Kingdom bases this 
right on various common law rules, statutory principles, and treaty ascension 
so that discrimination based on, or prohibition of, a worker’s membership to a 
 
 143. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 12, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364) 1, in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 28, 271 (2001). 
 144. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
Sept. 3, 1953, art.11, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
245 (2001); Wilson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30668/96, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 523 (2002). 
 145. 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS supra note 74, at 36-37. 
 146. Id. 
 147. BRAZ. CONST. Ch. 11 art. 8, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 13 (2002) (persons are free to form professional trade unions). 
 148. CAN. CONST. § 2, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 61 
(1999) (everyone is entitled to freedom of association). 
 149. F.R.G. CONST. art. 9, para. 3, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 9 (2003) (freedom of association to improve work and economic unions for everyone). 
 150. JAPAN CONST. art. 28, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 
17 (1990) (workers have a right to organize and bargain collectively). 
 151. MEX. CONST. art. 123, § XVI, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 100 (1998) (Every person has a right to form unions). 
 152. ITALY CONST. art. 18, 39, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 4 (2003) (Art. 18 protects citizens right to form trade associations freely, and Art. 39 
states that trade union organization is free). 
 153. S. AFR. CONST. art. 18, 23, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 14 (2004) (Art. 18 states that everyone has freedom of association, and Art. 23 that every 
worker has right to form trade unions). 
 154. SPAIN CONST. art. 22, 28, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 7 (2003) (Art. 22 recognizes the right of association, and Art. 28 that all persons have the 
right to unionize freely). 
 155. 29 U.S.C. § 157, § 201 (2000). 
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union is unlawful.156  Other examples of countries that recognize the freedom 
of association by statute include Australia157 and Singapore.158 
2. Non-Binding Resolutions and Treaties 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), passed in 1948, 
delineated specific universal human rights.159  Because it was passed as a 
declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, many states 
considered it a statement of principles rather than binding international law.160  
In the United States, some courts have reasoned that while the UDHR is not a 
treaty, it has “an effect similar to a treaty,” including the acceptance of the 
UDHR as customary international law.161  The UDHR holds that everyone has 
the right to peaceful assembly and association.162  The UHDR further indicates 
that everyone has rights to freedom of association and to form trade unions.163 
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1990.164  The Convention is an important 
standard for the protection of the rights of non-national workers.165  The 
Convention has not entered into force.166  The ICMW recognizes the principle 
of equal treatment between migrant and national workers with respect to 
conditions of work and terms of employment.167  The Convention also places 
an obligation upon state and private parties to guarantee the rights of migrant 
workers, without distinction as to their nationality or immigration status.168  
While the ICMW explicitly allows states to legislate immigration laws, 
including the exclusion of aliens, it does not allow unfair applicability of labor 
laws to those same aliens.169  As noted above, the ICMW is not binding, and 
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the United States is not a signatory to the instrument.  But this Convention is 
persuasive evidence that the rules and norms that have been derived from other 
national and international instruments, as applied to the rights of 
migrant/immigrant workers, have in fact risen to the level of customary 
international law. 
3. Industry Codes of Conduct 
Aside from the development of treaties or jurisprudence, many 
international bodies and conferences have developed instruments such as 
“codes of practice,” “standards,” and  “resolutions.”170  These instruments are 
sometimes referred to as “soft law,” as they are not legally binding.171  The 
development of these rules may either signify a further codification of existing 
customary law or indicate the emergence of new rules of customary law. 
External voluntary codes developed by nongovernmental organizations, 
private corporations, and other international actors further harmonize the 
principles of workplace conduct and lend support to the contention that the 
right to organize has risen to the level of customary international law.  On 
August 13, 2003, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights adopted the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.172  
This voluntary code of conduct explicitly recognized the freedom of 
association for employees in conformity with international treaties and 
covenants.173  This code, like ILO conventions, places a primary obligation on 
states to ensure that corporations and business entities within their jurisdictions 
respect the rights of workers.174 
Individual corporations and trade associations in conjunction with labor, 
human rights, and religious groups have developed voluntary codes of 
conduct.175  At least 240 voluntary codes of conduct addressing labor standards 
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have been identified,176 and at least forty-two corporations worldwide make 
explicit reference to the adoption of human rights standards in their own codes 
of conduct.177  Some of these voluntary codes of conduct explicitly recognize 
the freedoms of association and collective bargaining for workers.178  For 
example, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) has promulgated rules obliging 
members to comply with policies regarding child labor, discrimination, and 
freedom of association.179  An example of another developed standard is the 
Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) authored by the Council on Economic 
Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA).  This standard encourages 
companies to apply socially acceptable workplace practices in factories around 
the world.180  The SA8000 uses ILO Conventions and other human rights 
instruments as a basis for its rules.  The code specifies minimum compliance in 
the area of the rights to association and collective bargaining, among others.181 
These norms are evidence and instruments of a developing custom.182  The 
traditional focus on state obligations to enforce rights under domestic and 
international law has seen a shift towards corporations as entities capable of 
rule-making authority.183  Significant numbers of state and business entities 
have, over time, acted with the intent to be legally bound by these principles, 
thus giving them legal effect.  While these voluntary norms would not be 
considered legally binding instruments, they can be adopted as an authoritative 
interpretation of the responsibilities of business under international labor and 
human rights law.184  The norms serve not as an end in themselves, but as an 
important step toward the development of international human rights law.  
These norms can be applied toward state and non-state actors in promoting a 
legally binding regime for corporate conduct. 
C. Current International Legal Efforts 
Current advocacy efforts have called into question the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hoffman and have asked whether it can withstand scrutiny under 
international law.  In two recent actions brought forth to recognize the 
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international labor rights of undocumented immigrant workers, governments 
and NGOs have utilized international legal mechanisms to call into question 
the Court’s decision.  Currently, no decision has been made in either case. 
In November 2002, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) submitted a complaint before the ILO 
Freedom of Association Committee against the government of the United 
States.185  The complaint alleged that the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Hoffman violated the rights of undocumented workers including the 
right of freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to bargain 
collectively.186  The complaint further alleged that the United States was in 
breach of obligations under ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 under the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.187 
Complaints may be lodged by either employers or worker rights 
organizations to the International Labor Office, alleging that a member state 
has failed to implement its Convention obligations.188  Matters relating to the 
freedom of association are handled using a special procedure to supervise the 
implementation of this principle and to assure its application.189  Under this 
procedure, parties may submit a complaint to the Committee on the Freedom 
of Association (CFA) regardless of whether the state has ratified Convention 
No. 87 concerning the freedom of association or Convention No. 98 
concerning the right to organize.190  Under the ILO procedures, a complaint 
that is received and adopted would not have the effect of overturning the 
Supreme Court decision.  If the CFA determines that a complaint is violative 
of the Conventions, it may express concern to the government, recommend 
steps to remedy the situation, request a follow-up report, or initiate further 
investigation into the matter.191 
Additionally, in the wake of the decision in Hoffman, the Mexican 
Government requested an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.192  The request asked the Court to consider whether the United 
States was in violation of its international legal obligations by limiting labor 
law remedies based on immigration status.193  Several amicus curiae briefs 
were also filed with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at the request 
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of the government of Mexico.194  An amicus brief written on behalf of labor, 
civil, and immigrant’s rights organizations in the United States claimed that the 
United States was in violation of its international obligations by failing to 
protect the right to freedom of association and to bargain collectively.195  The 
brief argued that the unequal application of the law is a further violation of 
international law because it is discrimination based on nationality.196  Further, 
the brief enumerated several anecdotal harms that arose because of the Court’s 
decision in Hoffman.197 
V.  RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR IMMIGRANT WORKERS 
The modern concept of human rights law has well established that 
individuals are protected without regard to their status as nationals or aliens.198  
Several United Nations resolutions relating to the rights of migrant/immigrant 
workers also have been contemplated and adopted by the international 
community.199  These resolutions and work of the special committees of the 
United Nations and the International Labor Organization led to an emphasis 
that existing ILO instruments should protect migrant workers no matter their 
immigrant status.200  Further, as referenced above, many of the international 
treaties regarding the freedom of association obligate a state to provide access 
to a judicial process and an adequate remedy for violations of those rights.  For 
example, Article 26 of the ICCPR requires equality before the law regardless 
of “national origin . . . or other status.”201  The UDHR and customary 
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international law also establishes that a right conferred in a legal regime is 
entitled to an effective remedy.202 
The ILO’s current policy regarding national immigration laws and 
international labor rights states: 
[m]embers should apply the provision of this Recommendation within the 
framework of coherent policy on international migration for employment.  
That policy should be based upon the economic and social needs of both 
counties of origin and countries of employment; it should take account not 
only of short-term manpower needs and resources but also of the long-term 
social and economic consequences of migration for migrants as well for the 
communities concerned.203 
The ILO has noted, in a case involving the rights of undocumented workers in 
Spain, that a country’s legislation involving the prohibition of foreign workers 
can be justified.204  However, that same case reinforced the ILO position that 
the right of a country to exclude foreigners should not impinge on the 
fundamental right of association in contravention of ILO Convention No. 
87.205 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman conferred a right without an 
effective remedy under the NLRA.206  The Court’s decisions regarding 
remedies for undocumented workers who have suffered a violation under the 
NLRA only attempted to settle conflicts as they might exists between labor and 
immigration laws.207  However, the Court’s construction of labor and 
immigration laws did not consider the United States’ international legal 
obligations with respect to both worker and immigrant rights.208  If viewed in 
this context, the Court’s decision in Hoffman runs afoul of U.S. international 
legal obligations.  In other words, failure of an appropriate remedy for 
undocumented immigrant workers who have been fired for their union 
activities flouts the United States obligations under treaty and customary 
international law.209 
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Detractors of this position may argue that Hoffman did not strip all 
remedies for undocumented workers.  In fact, these workers are still afforded 
the right to cease and desist orders from a court for violation of the NLRA and 
to the requirement that an employer post notices of employee rights under the 
Act.210  Detractors might further argue that while customary international law 
may confer a right to a remedy, it does not specify the type of remedy to which 
an undocumented worker is entitled.  This argument, while compelling, does 
not take into account principles of non-discrimination in application of the 
law.211  Congress clearly set forth its mandate for a remedy of back pay for 
workers fired in contravention of the NLRA.  The Supreme Court’s decision to 
deny the right of back pay to a worker based on his or her immigration status 
violated the principle of non-discrimination.212  Further, Congress acted under 
immigration law to create civil and criminal penalties for employing 
undocumented workers and did not choose to preempt remedies for these same 
workers under the NLRA.213  The Supreme Court in rendering its decision to 
deny the remedy of back pay imposed a separate penalty on undocumented 
workers not contemplated by Congress. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is general agreement that the ATCA is an appropriate method for 
protecting human rights, although litigation promoting the use of the ATCA 
for labor rights is scarce.  The difficulty with the position of this paper is the 
recognition of a two-step violation.  First, the violation of the freedom of 
association involves an act on the part of a private employer.  Secondly, it also 
involves the failure of the state to enforce the right properly. 
The proposition that the Supreme Court’s decision violates both treaty and 
customary law is likely to garner much skepticism, despite the evidence 
demonstrated above.  Further, the call to utilize the ATCA to vindicate the 
freedom of association for undocumented workers will not likely be heeded in 
the near future.  But, it has been suggested that the ATCA was intended to 
provide a remedy “rarely provided in international law.”214  International law, 
while remotely enforceable through a system of global or regional institutions, 
is best enforced using national mechanisms.  The enforcement of international 
human rights norms plays a critical role in the implementation of international 
law.215  Noted scholar Joan Fitzpatrick may have summarized the future role of 
the ATCA well when she stated: 
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This two-hundred-year old statute is beginning to achieve its full flowering not 
only as a vehicle for vindicating the rights of victims of extreme tortious 
conduct but also as an emblem of the United States’ commitment to respect the 
principles of customary international law and faithful provisions of judicial 
remedies for its breach, despite the cynicism, indifference, or impotence of 
other states and international institutions.216 
The developing and uncertain nature of ATCA litigation for violations of 
human rights and labor rights makes a decision to pursue such an action in 
court difficult at best.  The practicalities of enforcing the right of association 
and remedy for undocumented workers via the ATCA in the United States 
faces considerable obstacles, only one of which is demonstrating before a court 
of law that the right of association falls within the realm of the law of 
nations.217  But, by taking the decision of the Court in Hoffman outside the 
context of domestic labor and immigration policy and placing it squarely in the 
context of international law, perhaps recognition that “illegal aliens” have 
enforceable rights will serve as an alarm for employers who would otherwise 
believe that these workers have no rights at all. 
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